This section contains the synthesis and conclusions. Parts I and IV can be thought of as mirror-image "bookends" to this volume. Whereas Chapter 1 introduces the themes of the volume, Chapter 13 recaps the findings of the case studies under these themes. Chapter 2 presents the conceptual framework, and Chapter 12 uses the framework to review the findings of the nine case studies and draw out broader lessons.
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The major theoretical enterprise of this book is to understand how the institutions of collective action and property rights influence rural poverty and livelihoods. Their links to sustainable natural resource management (NRM) are relatively well established, but this does not necessarily translate into poverty reduction. To address this question, we also need to look at the inclusiveness of these institutions; how they are influenced by (lack of) assets, risks, and governance structures that favor or disfavor poor people; and how these institutions shape the resources and strategies that poor and nonpoor actors use to further objectives of meeting basic needs and increasing income, security, social and political inclusion, or sustainability. We do this through a series of case studies that applies an extended version of the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework; the IAD framework was originally developed to isolate and understand the function of institutions in NRM. In this chapter we reflect on the findings from the nine case studies presented in this volume.
No single case study covered all aspects of the framework, and not all relationships hypothesized in Chapter 2 were covered by the case studies. Rather, each case study examined portions of the framework that were most relevant to that situation (Table 12.1) .
Although all studies touched on assets, they differed in the types of assets addressed and the degree of emphasis. For example, the Ethiopia-iddir (burial societies) and Philippines case studies treated financial, physical, and social assets comprehensively, while the Ethiopia-Afar, African Highlands Initiative, Indonesia, and Ethiopia-Somali studies placed much emphasis on natural and social assets, with relatively less emphasis on financial and physical assets. On the other hand, the India study emphasized natural and social assets but also considered the role of financial and physical assets. Risk was the starting point for the Ethiopia-iddir and Philippines studies and was important in the African Highlands Initiative, Ethiopia-Somali and -Afar, and Cambodia studies. The governance context was a focus of the Kenya, Indonesia, Ethiopia-Somali, Ethiopia-Afar, and Cambodia studies. Authors.
NOTE:
Linkages among context, institutions, and poverty outcomes are inherent in all of the case studies because all focused extensively on the effects of collective action on poverty outcomes. Property rights were a major element of the Indonesia, Ethiopia-Somali, and Ethiopia-Afar case studies and to some extent of the African Highlands Initiative study but were given less emphasis in the Ethiopia-iddir and Philippines studies. The Indonesia and Ethiopian pastoralism case studies stand out for their exploration of the interactions between collective action and property rights.
The action arenas in the case studies ranged from subcommunity groups (for instance, iddir in Ethiopia) to formal marketing organizations (as in Kenya) to interactions over resource management within the community (for example, in the African Highlands Initiative study), among communities, or between the communities and the state (as in India, Ethiopia-Afar, Ethiopia-Somali, Indonesia, and Cambodia). Four of the case studies (that is, the Ethiopia-iddir, Philippines, India, and Kenya studies) involved interactions in the action arena comprised solely of actors internal to the system, who have a direct stake and interest in the relevant action arena and are, in turn, directly affected by the outcomes of their interactions. The other five studies (the African Highlands Initiative, Indonesia, Ethiopia-Afar, Ethiopia-Somali, and Cambodia studies) involved both internal and external actors. The capacities in which external actors were involved, however, differed markedly, with the external actors in the African Highlands Initiative and Indonesia acting to aid negotiations among actors with different action resources and types of bargaining power in contrast to external actors that work to implement government policy, sometimes in a top-down fashion that impedes cooperation among actors.
Diverse poverty outcomes are explored, from direct impacts on incomes (that is, consumption and expenditures) in the Ethiopia-iddir, Philippines, Kenya, India, and Ethiopia-Afar studies to impacts on personal security (illness in the Ethiopia-iddir and Philippines studies) to more indirect impacts such as strengthened property rights for local resource users (Indonesia, African Highlands Initiative), improved coordination among officials and resource users (African Highlands Initiative, Indonesia), and resource privatization and extinguished rights for some resource users (Ethiopia-Somali), among other outcomes listed in Table 12.1. Taken together, the case studies form a mosaic from which a broader, complex picture emerges. In this chapter we examine the patterns of this mosaic first by tracing how various contextual factors (assets, risks, and governance arrangements) shape collective action and property rights and how these, in turn, affect the poverty outcomes as reported in the case studies, linking these back to hypotheses suggested by the framework presented in Chapter 2. We then revisit the action arena component of the framework for additional insights on how consideration of the different actors and their action resources can help to identify strategies that are likely to help (or harm) poor and marginalized groups, as well as the likely patterns of interaction for which we should be looking. The final section discusses emerging insights from the framework and the case studies on the role of collective action and property rights for poverty reduction.
Context

Assets
As Chapter 2 highlights, assets, both tangible and intangible, are crucial for the livelihoods of the poor, not only as the means of income generation but as instruments of accumulating other assets. The sustainable livelihoods approach (SLA) highlights the importance of different types of assets in the "asset pentagon": human, physical, financial, natural, and social capital (DfID 1999; Mwangi and Markelova 2009) . Public and political capitals are also often added as important assets in the portfolios of the poor (Winters, Davis, and Corral 2002; Birner and Wittmer 2003) . The creators of the SLA framework highlight that assets should be viewed and examined in relation to the vulnerability context and the institutions and policies that condition the socioeconomic environment (Bebbington 1999; Hulme and Shepherd 2003) ; the framework in this volume undertakes this approach as well. In the collection of case studies here, most of the households at the study sites are asset poor in terms of the natural, physical, financial, human, and public capitals. The African Highlands Initiative and Indonesia studies were the exception; there multistakeholder negotiations facilitated by the research teams through the participatory action research methodology brought communities together with the representatives of authorities at various levels. The rest of the studies revealed that the poor are significantly disadvantaged in terms of political capital. In fact, the Somali and Afar cases highlighted the antipastoralist policies of the Ethiopian state, which prevented the pastoralists from acquiring such assets. The stocks of other assets across the studies varied, and the poor quality of public assets (roads, infrastructure) was visible in most of the studies. Table 12 .2 lists the key assets that were addressed by each case study and their relationships to the institutions of collective action and property rights, as well as their influence on various poverty outcomes. Bebbington (1999) identifies several functions of the assets: instrumental (allowing households to make a living), hermeneutic (making living meaningful), and emancipatory (challenging power structures). These functions are illustrated by the case studies in this volume, especially that of social capital, which creates the basis for collective action. The findings from all research sites show that social capital is one type of asset that even the poor possess and in which they are able and willing to invest. These findings confirm the notion in poverty literature that social capital is indeed a vital asset (and action resource) for the resource poor, which Authors.
enables them to deal with the lack or difficulty of access to other assets (Grootaert 1999; Uphoff and Wijayaratna 2000) . The bases for these groups and networks are the institutional arrangements that help to enhance their livelihood options. These range from the kinship ties used for various purposes (such as to access water resources in the Somali study) to insurance schemes (such as iddir in Ethiopia) to conflict resolution mechanisms based on the traditional authority structures in the Cambodia study. Individuals and households belong to numerous groups and networks that allow them to compensate, to some extent, for the lack of other resources and allow disadvantaged households to reach certain poverty outcomes by serving as a valuable action resource. For example, in the Kenya study area the smallholder farmers have formed producer marketing groups (PMGs) to overcome market failures and difficulty in accessing financial markets, enabling them to make a better living (the instrumental function of social capital). In the Afar and Somali study areas, the norms of trust and reciprocity not only fulfill a livelihoods (that is, instrumental) function but also serve as a culturally important way of life (the hermeneutic function of social capital). In Indonesia, forest-dependent households have relied heavily on social capital by forming groups not only to engage in incomegenerating activities but also to lobby the authorities for change in forest access rights thus coping with deficiencies in other assets (instrumental and emancipatory functions). However, the case studies also reveal that asset endowments and asset accumulation processes are not the same for all, and the poor may be disadvantaged even with respect to social capital. For example, the Philippines study shows that the wealthier households belong to more productive (formal) networks from which the poorer households are excluded. The Ethiopia-iddir study demonstrates that households with larger landholdings (that is, greater endowments of natural capital) are part of larger and "better-quality" burial societies. Both of these studies highlight that the poor are disadvantaged in terms of accruing social capital. The Cambodia study shows that the landless or nearly landless and those with lower educational levels are less likely to participate in formalized groups such as cash associations and rice banks. Additionally, the African Highlands Initiative study points out that wealthier households have more influence on local authorities, or larger amounts of political capital, positioning them for easier accumulation of other assets and especially enabling them to gain greater access to natural resources. However, even resource-poor households are able to participate in groups and networks, even though the "quality" or the number of such memberships may be lower than in better-off families.
Of special importance to this volume are the institutions of collective action and property rights and their role in mediating poverty. These institutions figure prominently in the livelihood arrangements of the households at the research sites. As mentioned in Chapter 2, collective action can be understood as an outcome of social capital (Uphoff and Wijayaratna 2000) ; therefore, when examining the interaction between assets and collective action, it is clear that asset endowments affect households' ability and incentives to participate in collective activities. Better-endowed households are more likely to engage in collective action. By contrast, the Ethiopia-Afar and Ethiopia-Somali studies show the opposite effect of assets on participation in collective activities: they show that pastoralists with greater livestock endowments have fewer incentives to engage in groups for watershed and pasture management. Therefore, the effect of assets on collective action is variable and context dependent: it is clear that participation in groups and networks often provides a valuable fallback option for the asset poor, whereas wealthier households may use their asset base either to "opt out" of group ventures or as a means to participate in and influence the outcomes of collective activities.
The studies show that collective action can contribute to asset accumulation, thus increasing the action resources of the poor and leading to better poverty outcomes. For example, the Kenyan farmers studied are able to access financial and product markets via their participation in the action arena of PMGs. Indonesian forest-dependent communities are able to negotiate their rights to the forests and forest products because of their engagement in the collective negotiation and lobbying activities catalyzed by the Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR). The Ethiopia-iddir study shows that through collective action the poor are able to prevent the loss of human capital in times of shocks, illustrating the links between assets (social capital in this case) and risks. The Philippines case reveals that remittances from migrant networks, a form of intrafamilial collective action, enable households to build up stocks of both physical and human capital that may be negatively affected by a shock. The Ethiopia-Afar study reveals similar findings for collective farming, which is used by the pastoralists to compensate for the diminished amounts of natural and political capitals in the context of unfavorable government policies (which could be classified as sociopolitical shocks). In the India study, participation in collective watershed management institutions has been seen to improve the stock of natural capital.
Property rights are fundamental for tangible assets. These rights determine who can benefit from "natural capital," be it forests in the Indonesia study or grazing lands and water sources in the Afar and Somali studies. The literature on property rights shows that they are not just about ownership (individual or communal) but cover all aspects of resource tenure from access rights to management rights to the ability to derive an income from access to a resource (see Schlager and Ostrom 1992; Ribot 1998; Meinzen-Dick and Mwangi 2009 ). The case studies collected in this volume provide a strong illustration of this point. The Indonesia study shows that the poor are organizing to obtain not just access to the forest but also the right to harvest and sell nontimber forest products, that is, to secure a source of income. The Ethiopia-Afar case shows that rights to grazing lands are complicated and intertwined with many other institutions such as kinship ties and interclan reciprocity. In Cambodia the entire structure of individual and communal property rights is in flux as a result of the country's sociopolitical background and the ambiguity in the current land laws; in this case, property rights are understood as different levels of access arrangements ranging from using lands in common to land grabbing to formal private land titling.
What impact does the assets-institutions nexus have on poverty reduction? The case studies show that although many of the poor may lack natural, physical, financial, public, and human capitals, most of them are endowed with social capital through membership in various groups and networks. Even though the distribution of social capital is not equal among the poor, many households are able to engage in various collective action institutions, ranging from insurance schemes to resource management arrangements, which allow them to cope with disadvantages faced in the accumulation of other types of assets. Thus, collective action enables them to avoid falling deeper into poverty (Ethiopia-iddir, Philippines) and even improve their livelihoods (Kenya). However, in several cases poor men and women face certain barriers to participation in collective activities (Cambodia, Philippines, African Highlands Initiative); in other situations, collective action is an institution used more by poorer families than by their better-off cohorts (Afar, Somali). On the other hand, the India case shows that collective action does not directly lead to improvements in welfare. Improvements in resource conditions may have an indirect effect on welfare with longer gestation periods, but unless the poor have rights to the benefit streams, they will not share in the direct benefits, because the landless are left out in India.
Property rights institutions fulfill an important function in the lives of the poor: they provide a means to obtain other assets and determine households' access to other assets, thus serving as valuable action resources and paving the way to acquire other action resources. Here again the wealthier households are able to take greater advantage of these institutions. The Ethiopia-Somali and Ethiopia-Afar studies show that households with larger livestock herds and more political connections were able to secure rights to individual pastures and water sources and thus exclude the poorer pastoralists (or charge them user fees). The Indonesia study mentions that private companies gained rights to large parts of forest areas. In all these cases, communal rights proved to be of great importance to the poor (see Wily 2006) . Therefore, the findings of the case studies show that what happens with the assets in the action arena can lead to different patterns of interaction; depending on how assets are used and transformed in the action situation, cooperation, elite capture, or even conflict can occur and influence poverty outcomes in different ways.
Risks and Shocks
Chapter 2 highlights that vulnerability to risks is an important element of the multidimensional reality of the poor, or the context in which they live. It has a direct impact on poverty outcomes (lowering incomes, leading to greater social exclusion, adversely impacting personal and property security, and so on), which makes it necessary for any poverty-related study to examine the impact of shocks on the poor and the mechanisms used to deal with various uncertainties. The case studies presented in this volume confirm the findings in the literature that the poor are very vulnerable to risks from various sources (Jalan and Ravallion 1999; Dercon 2002 ) and illustrate how assets as well as the institutions of collective action and property rights are used to mitigate the effect of shocks. This section highlights lessons learned from the studies on the interaction between poverty and vulnerability and examines how vulnerability influences collective action and property rights and what institutional arrangements the poor employ to deal with risk.
As discussed in Chapter 2, three types of shocks are usually identified in the literature: natural, economic, and sociopolitical shocks (Little et al. 2001; Dercon 2002) . Earlier studies on the interaction between vulnerability and poverty also revealed that health shocks, primarily death and illness, are identified by the poor as the most harmful (Krishna et al. 2004 ). In addition, risks occur with varying frequency and predictability, which affects households' ability to prepare for them. Both of these characteristics of the nature of shocks are important because they demand different coping strategies and affect the institutions of collective action and property rights in different ways. The studies reported in this volume show that certain risks are not specific to any region; the poor in both East Africa and South Asia face droughts, which have devastating consequences for their agricultural production. Similarly, households in both Asia and Africa have to cope with economic shocks such as seasonal price changes, market risks, and increasing oil prices. In addition, the Indonesia, Ethiopiaiddir, and Kenya studies show that the poor are adversely affected by health shocks, such as the spread of HIV and malaria as well as the incipient epidemic of avian flu. Political instability and conflicts over resources also appear in several of the case studies (Ethiopia-Afar and Ethiopia-Somali, Cambodia, Indonesia, and the Philippines). Table 12 .3 presents the most prominent shocks encountered in each of the case studies, along with their frequency or predictability and their links with institutions of collective action and property rights that influence poverty outcomes. Alderman and Paxson (1994) identify two general types of strategies that the poor use in dealing with shocks: risk-coping mechanisms, which include self-insurance through assets, savings, and informal group-based risksharing, and risk management strategies, which mainly involve income diversification. The case studies presented in this volume provide examples of both. In the discussion of assets earlier in this chapter we mentioned the linkages between various types of assets and the ability to withstand shocks (and, conversely, the effects of shocks on fluctuations of assets).
The case studies reported in this volume show that shocks and their perceived consequences provide incentives for people to engage in collective action. Authors.
People form networks and groups, both formal and informal, to cope with shocks as they realize their inability to deal with these shocks on an individual basis and have experienced the benefits of joint action in their economic and other activities. Collective action is an effective and widely used risk-mitigating method among the poor in the absence of well-functioning credit and insurance markets. Several of the studies show that membership in formal and informal groups and networks is a crucial element in the risk-smoothing portfolios of the poor by serving as both an ex ante (Ethiopia-iddir) and an ex post mechanism (African highlands, Ethiopia-Afar, Philippines). However, they also provide evidence supporting the hypothesis presented in Chapter 2 that collective action has limitations in dealing with covariate shocks compared with idiosyncratic shocks. Collective action also has limitations in ensuring equitable participation opportunities for both the better off and the poor, as demonstrated in the Ethiopia-iddir and Philippines case studies.
The findings also support the hypothesis stated in Chapter 2 that the frequency of shocks influences these incentives for organizing, with collective action a more common response to frequent, relatively predictable risks than to rarer, less predictable shocks. On the one hand, the Ethiopia-iddir and Philippines studies show that health shocks were identified by respondents themselves as among the most damaging shocks affecting household well-being; therefore, these risks provided a greater incentive for people to form iddir and familial networks. This finding confirms the results of other studies in these and other countries (see Dercon 2002; Krishna et al. 2004; Fafchamps and Gubert 2007) . Similarly, in the African Highlands Initiative case study it was the persistent natural resource problems (pests and soil degradation) that provided an impetus for organizing and collectively finding solutions to these problems. Climatic variations that resulted in price fluctuations for agricultural products led to the formation of PMGs in Kenya and watershed associations in India. These studies show that in addition to often being the only viable risk-coping options for the asset-poor households, groups and networks help deal with the information asymmetries in the formal insurance markets (Udry 1994) . On the other hand, where the shocks were less frequent and therefore less predictable (for example, in the case of climatic distress), there was less incentive to organize. The literature on collective action in NRM shows that there are both tangible and intangible costs of cooperation (Meinzen-Dick et al. 2002) . These costs, observed in the Kenya and India case studies, show that risks that occur less frequently do not force people to prepare for them ex ante by forming or joining groups with the purpose of risk sharing. Furthermore, these less frequent but drastic events, such as policy shifts in the Ethiopia-Afar case, can undermine local collective action by destroying trust among the community members. Even if rare, such major events as civil war have long-term repercussions, as seen in Cambodia.
As for the interaction between vulnerability and property rights, the Indonesia case study shows that large-scale sociopolitical shocks, such as decentral-ization, can create ambiguity around rights to resources and thus lead to conflict and deteriorating welfare. In this case, however, it was this uncertainty of access to and ownership of resources that created fertile ground for local collective action around property rights issues. In the Afar and Somali studies, unpredictable government policies of privatizing common pastoral lands produced uncertainty around rights to land, which led to the breakdown in social capital (trust) and the decline of some collective action institutions. In Cambodia, shifts in property rights arrangements as a result of changing political regimes also created ambiguity, which led to conflicts over resources and greater income inequality. All these cases demonstrate that property rights themselves can become a source of sociopolitical risk, which in some cases can provide incentives to collectively deal with it, either through organizing around lobbying for greater access to resources (Indonesia) or through forming groups to diversify income from a risky activity (Ethiopia-Afar).
Risk management strategies are well illustrated in the Afar and Somali cases, where farming (versus the traditional livestock herding) is used to diversify climate-related and sociopolitical risks by way of collective farming (that is collective action as an instrument of income diversification). However, although the poor employ multiple strategies to deal with risk, the poverty outcomes are heterogeneous and are based on their asset portfolios and other coping strategies available to them. Earlier studies have shown that even informal mechanisms seem to be less effective for the poor than for their better-off counterparts (Jalan and Ravallion 1999; Dercon and Krishnan 2000) . The findings in the Ethiopiaiddir and Philippines studies demonstrate the interactions among assets, ability to withstand shocks, and the role played by the institutions of collective action in mitigating risks. These studies show that the poor are disadvantaged in terms of joining groups: better-off households belong to a greater number and "higherquality" groups as well as to more productive networks than do poorer families. Similarly, in Afar the poorer families cannot mitigate shocks well with just livestock because it is a lumpy asset, while the wealthier rely on accumulating and diversifying livestock (in terms of both species and location of herding) and thus have more reliable risk management options.
Property rights to land and other resources are necessary for people to be able to use their assets during shocks. Both pastoral cases in Ethiopia (Afar and Somali) also show that flexible property rights arrangements are also a response to highly fluctuating environments, enabling people to reduce their risk of not having water for their animals, supporting the hypothesis offered in Chapter 2 that infrequently occurring risks about which there is an imprecise knowledge of their probability are likely to lead to flexible property rights arrangements. These studies also show that those with a larger asset base prefer fixed, in most cases individual (versus communal), property rights for their risk-smoothing portfolios. Unclear property rights can also be a source of risk: as the Indonesia and Cambodia case studies show, the ambiguity of access to vital resources can generate shocklike conditions (conflicts), which were dealt with in these cases via various forms of collective action.
In sum, the case studies reveal the twofold link between vulnerability and the institutions of collective action and property rights: susceptibility to risk creates incentives for the creation of these institutions, and these institutions serve as instruments of coping with risks. Most important, these examples highlight that the poor are not passive recipients of their "fate" who have no resources to use in the action arena. On the contrary, the case studies show that in the context of a complex and uncertain environment, the poor have become skillful managers of their portfolios, employing multiple strategies to cope with shocks even though they may still be somewhat limited in the options they have to reduce their vulnerability. Collective action institutions, such as iddir or familial networks that emerge from the existing stocks of social capital, serve as valuable action resources that result in cooperation (pattern of interaction) to mitigate the negative impacts of shocks and prevent losses in income and the provision of basic needs. Unclear property rights to resources (natural capital), as in the Ethiopia-Afar and Ethiopia-Somali studies, become a source of risk, prevent the poor from using their assets in the action arena, and may lead not only to cooperation but also to elite capture and even conflicts (other types of patterns of interaction), resulting in negative poverty outcomes. Which pattern of interaction emerges from the action arena in this case is greatly influenced by the governance structures in place, which are discussed in the next section.
Governance Structures
This section reflects on the legal, political, and power structures that conditioned the collective action and property rights of the poor in the case studies presented in this volume. The conceptual framework introduced in Chapter 2 suggests that the governance structures in which poor people are embedded exert a major influence on their abilities to organize to improve their income streams or resource access or to take advantage of opportunities. These initial conditions also determine the substantive rights of individuals and their ability to access or exploit those rights in order to improve their well-being.
In the case studies reported in this book, the governance structures in which people were embedded included the following:
• Norms and customs endogenous to communities (in the Ethiopia-Somali and Ethiopia-Afar studies), including other structural attributes of communities such as ethnic heterogeneity.
• Formal rules external to communities, often introduced by governments, with varying state capacity. These included decentralization reforms (Indonesia, Ethiopia-Afar), sedentarization or modernization reforms (Somali and Afar), and market liberalization (Kenya).
• Project rules and norms generated by nongovernmental actors such as CIFOR (Indonesia) and the African Highlands Initiative, which actively support community organizing and rights through projects and also constitute the context for communities.
• Formal organizational practices, for example, strategies for the delivery of agricultural extension services that left out women farmers (African Highlands Initiative) or charged membership fees to PMGs (Kenya).
Although many programs and policies focus on the formalized rules introduced by governments, these are not the only relevant legal and political structures that shape people's lives. A range of customary norms are also important, and it is crucial to understand how these interact with formal external legal structures. This legal pluralism has implications for both property rights and collective action. Finally, organizational practices are also relevant, because these practices will shape how formal rules are implemented, and how people can interact with the organizations, internal or external to the community. Table  12 .4 presents a summary of how governance structures encountered in each case study interacted with collective action and property rights to influence outcomes. The remainder of this section discusses how these factors play out in the case studies in this volume.
In the Ethiopia-Somali study (Chapter 10) customary rules and practices provided a basis for collective access to and management of water in a dry, semiarid environment. These rules determined group membership, the nature of rights, responsibility for facility maintenance, and sanctions for noncompliance. Customary rules also defined conditions of access by nonmembers. These rules coordinated the use of sparsely distributed and highly variable resources by multiple users. Their inclusiveness and flexibility allowed both the poor and the less poor group members and recognized nonmembers to use water for their needs, even during times of scarcity (Niamir-Fuller 1999; Meinzen-Dick, Mwangi, and Dohrn 2006) .
However, an influx of refugees and a series of government projects undermined the coordinating function of customary rules and sanctions. These acted as disincentives to group participation, especially of wealthier herders, who withdrew their support and instead sought to privatize water resources and concentrate the benefits of a previously communal resource among themselves. Because wealthier members often play a critical role in collective action, providing leadership and sometimes even underwriting collective action when it is in their interest (Olson 1965) , their withdrawal from the group particularly undermines group efforts. These findings are supportive of the hypothesis in Chapter 2 that in legal systems where statutory systems are dominant, collective action among local communities may not only be crowded out but repressed altogether. This was also true in the Ethiopia-Afar case study, as we see in the next paragraph.
Rules and practices that are imposed from the outside also affect whether poor people can exercise existing resource rights or self-organize to improve their lives and livelihoods without retribution. Repeated government policies and interventions aimed at modernizing pastoralists in Ethiopia (see the Ethiopia-Afar study in Chapter 9) forcibly appropriated communal lands, circumscribed access to critical pastoral resources, and weakened traditional clanbased rules and norms for the collective use and management of pasture and resources. This is not far afield from Scott's (1999) observations that powerful states in different parts of the world, in their attempts at political control, forced through ambitious, large-scale schemes that disregarded or destroyed local knowledge and institutions built up over generations. This imposition and enforcement of rules from the outside in Ethiopia-Afar has been found to restrict within-group cooperation, resulting in the dominance of individual strategies, such as privatization. By weakening the mutual dependence that provided the incentive to cooperate in the first place, privatization undermined collective action (Runge 1986; Seabright 1993) .
Similarly, in Uganda (see the African Highlands Initiative study in Chapter 7) the state's desire to fully control protected areas resulted in the eviction of ethnic minorities and loss of access to a major livelihood source. The Indonesia case study (Chapter 8) also documents a sociopolitical setting that has undermined the rural peoples' access to resources. By devolving forest management to district authorities without clarifying rights, roles, and responsibilities or providing budgetary support, the reforms created ambiguities and revenue deficits that resulted in the conversion of forests to "profitable" plantations, the allocation of concessions to state and private firms, and insecurities for indigenous communities that lived and farmed in the forests. It also heightened conflict between communities, district and central governments, and private concessionaires. Power asymmetries among state agents, concessionaires, and the rural poor are vast, posing difficulties for local-level organizing to reclaim rights.
The outcomes of Indonesia's forestry devolution program (and of other top-down reforms) are consistent with the discussion of decentralization in Chapter 2 and echo the findings of other scholars and practitioners who suggest that where the legal framework in support of decentralization is ambiguous as to the rights, roles, and responsibilities of relevant actors (such as local communities, local governments, central governments, and other private entrepreneurs), opportunities for the capture of benefits by local and national elites abound, often to the exclusion of the poorer communities that inhabit forests and forest margins (Manor 1999; Larson 2005) . Such ambiguities are also associated with the increased insecurity of the customary rights of resource users (McCarthy 2004) . The Cambodia case (Chapter 11) represents an extreme example of state terror's decimating existing local forms of social capital that inhered in customary and religious systems and forcibly appropriating resources by evicting people from forests. Current decentralization reforms in the natural resources and land sectors are further redistributing resources away from the rural poor to military and urban elites. Authors.
An absence of state intervention can provide space for community organizing. Market liberalization policies, the removal of state marketing boards, and the promotion of the private sector created opportunities for the formation of participatory marketing groups in semiarid parts of Kenya (see Chapter 5). Moreover, the government's lack of provision of health insurance and its complete absence from intervention in iddir in Ethiopia (see Chapter 3) has provided an opportunity for the expansion and diversification of burial groups into a wide range of activities, including the provision of illness and health insurance. It has also provided an opportunity for iddir to develop formal rules that are adapted to their ecological environment and membership demographics.
Although governments can affect people's livelihoods through the reforms they pursue, they can also affect people directly through their practices when implementing sectoral activities. In the African Highlands Initiative study, targeting individuals (instead of groups) for the management of common pool resources limited possibilities for joint action to solve common problems. By selectively excluding women from access to new technologies, extension officers systematically undercut women's roles as relevant community actors and constrained their efforts to provide for their livelihoods. The exclusion of women through government practice is also evident in the Indonesia case study, in which women were rarely seen participating in public meetings and decisionmaking forums prior to CIFOR's intervention. These findings support the hypothesis in Chapter 2 that the poor are disadvantaged by decisionmaking rules-in these cases, even by the rules and approaches of development agencies. These can undermine the potential for collective action among communities and in some cases may actively create conditions that further marginalize the poor.
The previous discussion highlights several issues that are consistent with the governance component of the conceptual framework: the legal and political structures that comprise formal policy and law that is external to communities, as well as customary structures that originate from communities, can and do influence local-level efforts at poverty reduction. 1 Externally enforced solutions, even well-intended ones such as decentralization and devolution, can undermine local-level rights to resources, even if they have built-in provisions and support for community participation and resource management. External solutions that are not attuned to local needs and actively seek to stamp out local forms of organizing and rights through the use of force only increase the vulnerability of the poor. Finally, faulty implementation of government projects can constrain local livelihood efforts.
It is not inevitable for state-society interactions to have negative consequences for communities' collective attempts to provide for their livelihoods or access resources vital to their production systems. Much depends on the way reforms are structured and, critically, on whether such state-led reforms are animated by local-level needs (Anderson and Ostrom 2008) . The back and forth of Indonesia's and Uganda's forestry sector decentralization, in which rules were made, unmade, and remade in rapid succession, affected the patterns of resource distribution and authority between government agencies and authorities at different governance levels and also between them and resource users. It created uncertainties and ambiguities with regard to resource allocation decisions and accountability processes, which in turn allowed for elite capture in which wellconnected individuals in positions of advantage directed benefits toward themselves. A better understanding of the effect of such governance changes on the action arena can help societies to anticipate the outcomes of reforms.
Similar processes are evident in the top-down privatization of resources in Ethiopia and Cambodia. In these cases, a disregard for local practices and norms that evolved over many years under conditions of ecological variability weakened customary authority and norms of water access and distribution. It resulted in the privatization of communal resources, the exclusion of legitimate claimants, and the imposition of water fees. Once again, greater attention to the interplay of institutions and environment at the local level (instead of government enforcement and compulsion) and an attempt to complement existing customary practices on the basis of comparative advantage across governance and ecological scales would have had less dramatic consequences in terms of the capacities to organize (Mwangi and Ostrom 2009) .
Overall, what can we learn regarding how governance structures interact with the rest of the elements of the conceptual framework, including property rights and collective action, in order to produce outcomes? The case studies in this book support the hypothesis presented in Chapter 2 that governance structures greatly influence poverty outcomes. For example, when reforms are conducted within a governance system that is characterized by weak state institutions that lack enforcement capabilities or clarity, they can increase rather than reduce vulnerability and hence poverty. More specifically, when rule changes occur (in such areas as decentralization, sedentarization, or modernization) and no effort is made to moderate differentials in authority, power, knowledge, and information among societal actors (that is, action resources among actors in the action arena), better-endowed actors will exploit their action resources to advance their gains to the detriment of less endowed actors. Government actors, for example, may manipulate, intimidate, or coerce respected and legitimate (but often weaker) customary authorities into enforcing new rules. Similarly, wealthier, more powerful individuals (or corporate individuals) may use their influence to seek a disproportionate allocation of resources to themselves. These actions in the action arena (that is, patterns of interaction that are characterized by noncooperation and exclusion) may lead to a decline in collective action and sharpen individual strategies, wealth concentration, and loss of access for and exclusion of poorer, less influential individuals. Exclusion and loss of resource access undermine the ability of poorer individuals and groups to provide for their livelihoods (that is, achieve positive poverty outcomes).
The expectation of elite capture of benefits in reform settings can be refined to incorporate further lessons from the case studies in this volume. For example, negotiation support brokered by trusted actors in the action arena can serve to increase the bargaining power of poorer or marginalized individuals or groups (that is, their action resources) and encourage cooperation among actors with vastly different action resources (that is, patterns of interaction) to secure their property rights to resources and their access to decisionmaking processes. Collective action by the poor is an insufficient safeguard, and the brokerage of external actors and champions may be necessary to improve outcomes, especially for the very poor.
The Action Arena
Although contextual factors play an important role in shaping the institutions of collective action and property rights, the action arena is where it all comes together in the interplay among individual or collective actors who have preferences and action resources and are subject to rules that order their interactions. Actors, action resources, and decisionmaking arrangements delimit the space in which actors form strategies, make choices, and take action. Better understanding of the action arena can help us to understand and anticipate how changes in conditions are likely to affect poverty outcomes, but because there is human agency, these outcomes are not deterministic. This section reviews some of the further insights on these processes represented in the case studies in this volume.
Action resources provide the actor with the ability to act in pursuit of his or her preferences. These action resources comprise the tangible assets discussed earlier, as well as intangible assets such as information, informationprocessing capabilities, power endowments, status, and mental models, among others. Mental models, on the level of knowing things as well as on the normative level, also delimit the capacity of actors to make choices and take action. In this regard, actors may not always make deliberate or conscious choices but often act based on "rules of thumb," "what we have always done," or "what is expected of me." In the scope of this study, agency itself reflects the ability to exercise livelihood choices, to participate in collective action at various levels to affect livelihoods, and to influence other actors' choices, as well as to get involved in political processes, consistent with the role attributed to agency in other poverty-related literature (Hulme and Shepherd 2003) .
In the case studies presented in this book, we encounter a range of actors who are broadly representative of actors in any given empirical setting. These include officials in various capacities in government ministries, such as the Ministry of Forestry in Indonesia or general officials in Ethiopia, each pursuing objectives consistent (or not) with their official mandates and bearing the resources of power, status, information, budgets, and networks that characterize their positions. In addition, we encounter men and women from distinct communities, interacting with each other and, in some cases, with the officials to whom they can gain access. As the framework in Chapter 2 proposes, all these actors are endowed with individual assets or collective resources (such as group organization and networks) critical for pursuing various livelihoods and welfare-enhancing objectives, from marketing produce to coping with illness risks, securing individual and collective access to critical natural resources, enabling collective farming, or even resisting top-down efforts at pastoral sedentarization. Their interactions with each other and with external actors are subject to the assets that they own, their positions and status in their societies, and their networks and connections with political actors within and outside their communities. In some cases these interactions are also influenced by socialized notions of appropriate actions due to individuals' roles and status in their communities.
There is considerable evidence to support the hypothesis stated in Chapter 2 that the poor are disadvantaged by lack of action resources, with natural capital (such as land and water) especially important in the Ethiopia-Somali case study and social capital critical in the Ethiopia-iddir and Philippines studies. Political capital, or voice, emerged as a critical action resource in many of the case studies, and lack of political capital left marginalized groups with little ability to shape the decisionmaking rules (as in Ethiopia-Afar and Cambodia studies), unless there was outside facilitation (as in the Indonesia or the African Highlands Initiative study).
As discussed in the earlier sections on governance, assets, and risks, the state and its policies and actions play a prominent role in enabling or hindering poor people's transition in and out of poverty, influencing how these contextual factors affect poverty outcomes. Government agents, whether from the local or the central government, have at their discretion a wide range of resources that can facilitate or encumber people's access to resources, which in turn have implications for livelihoods. In Indonesia, for example, government actors in the Ministry of Forestry, the National Land Agencies, and the provincial and district administrations have various authorities and powers. These include the power to recommend forest conversion to different land uses, to issue permits to private concessionaires, to endorse community property rights to resources (including use and ownership), to enter into social forestry or joint forest management agreements with communities, and to craft and implement development plans and budgets. In addition, they are endowed with privileged knowledge and information of the new decentralization laws and provisions, and also with networks that extend to other actors in society, including local communities, village elites, and private entrepreneurs.
Much as in Indonesia, the government in Ethiopia has proven to be a dominant actor in the reconfiguration of property rights and production systems in the drylands (see the Ethiopia-Afar and Ethiopia-Somali case studies). Not only has it used law, budgets and finances, information, and propaganda to appropriate pastoral land and convert it to agricultural state farms; it has also exploited ideological discourses of modernization to push through its sedentarization policies. By characterizing pastoralism as a primitive and inefficient use of scarce resources, it has legitimized the use of institutions (including decrees), budgets, and even the military to coerce pastoralists to adopt its sedentarization program. The introduction of ethnicity-based federalism, a stateled reform, reverted power to clan elders, while at the same time introducing a new set of actors (local government as well as NGOs), and a new process for completing the farming and sedentarization project of earlier years. The power of persuasion, through provision of information on farming techniques and the provision of capital and farming implements, was a key action resource employed by external actors. In the Ethiopia-Somali case study, the central government has been a key factor in the provision of water resources, seeking to construct low-cost water-harvesting technologies to supplement community sources. As in the Ethiopia-Afar case study, such state-led programs have relied on their capacity to mobilize community labor for construction and maintenance through the imposition of financial penalties enforced by co-opted team leaders drawn from the traditional leadership. Nonetheless, users are more responsive to clan rules and leadership that is rooted in community ideology and history, which provide a historical basis for stable and recognized reciprocal access and negotiation across a vast territory (see also the Cambodia case study).
Individuals and communities with lower stocks of assets, including political capital, have leveraged their resources, individual and collective, in their efforts to construct and sustain their livelihoods. In Indonesia, for example, local actors, both women and men, had available to them the capacity to organize, but often they did so along narrow gendered lines. This ability to organize with considerable facilitation and information about alternative options from NGOs proved valuable in increasing their bargaining power, to the extent that they were able to make demands of government officials, pursue land certification through government-sponsored programs, create space for their views and needs to be reflected in local planning priorities, bargain with governmentsponsored private concessionaires to recover and sustain their claims to forest resources, and obtain additional information and access to different governmentsupported community development programs and grants. However, bargaining power can also be used to resist state action (as opposed to making demands of the state), as did the numerous pastoralists in the Ethiopia-Afar case study, who used their sheer numbers to sabotage and frustrate state-led efforts to sedentarize them.
Community actors on their own also draw on their own self-organizing capacities to achieve mutual benefits. In the Kenya case, for example, which also involved NGO facilitation through the provision of information and improved crop varieties, individuals contributed their own resources to the group effort by paying annual membership fees, attending meetings, and providing cash capital. There were no ideological barriers to women's participation. Individual assets such as land, livestock, and education enabled participation but were not exclusionary. Similarly, reciprocal social networks, including burial societies, were valuable action resources for coping with illness and drought shocks in the Ethiopia-iddir and Philippines case studies. These studies have shown how social capital can be turned into a valuable action resource to obtain certain poverty outcomes. Yet the extent of access to such social resources is, in turn, predicated on an individual's access to material wealth such as landholdings or livestock holdings or to nonmaterial resources such as status or connections within the village. In the Philippines, in particular, wealth and education are important action resources that allow better-endowed individuals to belong to more groups and networks, enhancing their abilities to insure themselves against economic losses. Membership in groups assumes even more significance as an action resource because it has a positive impact on the number of networks that individuals can access.
Alternatively, group membership can determine whether individuals gain property rights to critical resources for their livelihoods. Among the Somali and Afar of Ethiopia, reciprocal access to water resources, a limiting production factor in the dryland environment, is dependent on kinship and clan membership, even though operational access is predicated on the contribution of labor to construction and maintenance of water facilities. However, in certain circumstances the authority and local legitimacy of clan elders have been subverted by state actors and instead used to mobilize community participation and to enforce sanctions through fines and capital punishment. Also, with changing socioeconomic conditions and community differentiation, wealth became an important resource that allowed community elites, including clan elders, to privatize land and water resources and to extract rents from previously communal resources.
Although a lack of livestock wealth may have mitigated against some pastoralists in Afar making use of the rights to resources, the availability of suitable land opened up alternative livelihoods options, such as farming. Provision of information on farming possibilities, farm machinery, and irrigation equipment by external actors further boosted the tendency toward adopting collective action for farming. Land ownership after subdivision of state farms provided bargaining power to pastoralists to enter into sharecropping arrangements and also to derive incomes from lease contracts with cultivating communities. However, the pastoralists' inability to read and write, their lack of accounting skills, and their poor farming skills undermine the nature of the contracts they can enter into with the cultivating highlanders, who have these resources and skills. After subdivision a larger share of state farms went to clan elites and wealthier individuals with political connections, to the disadvantage of poorer cattle herders. This situation is similar to Mwangi's (2007) findings on the subdivision and privatization of Maasai group ranches in Kenya.
The role of ideology, captured in the account of forced sedentarization by government agencies in Ethiopia, is also reflected in the marginalization of women in the distribution of land after the subdivision of state farms. Culturally, women are generally regarded as minors and thus have no rights to own property. In the Filipino society, by contrast, gendered roles and expectations influence the action resources exploited by men and women. Daughters, socialized to have a responsible, nurturing role, often migrate to urban areas and send remittances home, while sons, engaged in agricultural production, are a source of information on agricultural production technologies. The functioning of the networks, however, is diminished by ideological notions of embarrassment, especially of the very poor, who feel ashamed to seek support from their friends and neighbors.
Based on the discussion of the action arena in Chapter 2, if particular categories of actors are disadvantaged because the rules in that arena call for action resources that those actors lack, there are two strategies that can help them: strengthening their action resources to enable them to operate more effectively within the existing rule structures or changing the rules to valorize the action resources that they do possess. The African Highlands Initiative case study illustrates the strategy of changing the rules, with intervention by the African Highlands Initiative helping to demonstrate the value of local knowledge as opposed to "scientific" approaches to resource management. Collective action provides a mechanism for these scientific approaches to build on the social capital that many of the case studies report as an asset of the poor. Although individuals are able to use their human and physical assets to enhance their own welfare, they are also able to band together in groups and networks to improve access to resources and services they would otherwise not be able to access as individuals. Yet this is not a panacea for redressing poverty and inequality: those with less human capital and fewer physical assets have limited access to collective enterprises; gendered roles in society can also constrain such access. It is important to note that where groups are successfully mobilized, either from within themselves or through access to external actors with information and resources, they are able to make demands of state actors that have welfare-enhancing implications. Collective action can be a source of power. On the other hand, state power and resources can be successfully deployed to undermine and even demobilize community action.
Patterns of Interaction
As described in Chapter 2, patterns of interaction are observable, regularized behavior patterns that result from the bargaining processes that occur between the actors in the action situation, depending on their action resources. They are both suboutcomes of the action arena and in turn determine the final outcomes of the action situation. These regularized behaviors are conditioned by various rules, norms, strategies, and conventions (that is, institutions) that emerge in the action arena. This section looks at the observable mechanisms by which the interactions between the actors occur and discusses how these particular patterns influence outcomes.
Actions by individuals and groups and their interactions lead to diverse outcomes that can affect well-being directly or indirectly. Outcomes can comprise direct improvements in welfare indicators such as incomes, consumption, nutrition, and health. Outcomes can also be intermediate by way of changing institutions that are anticipated to improve well-being over the longer run.
From all the studies in this volume, the patterns of interaction that emerge during the processes occurring in the action arena can be grouped into several common categories. Even though these do not account for all observable behaviors among the actors in the case studies, they show that despite the differences in context (or initial conditions), some repeated interactions between actors mediated by the institutions of collective action and property rights are similar across settings.
• Cooperation and collective activities: All the case studies highlighted that in the context of poverty, the livelihoods of households within and across communities are interdependent. Collective action emerged as a potent tool in poor peoples' struggles to sustain or improve their livelihoods. The poor rely on help from their kin, neighbors, and friends in the context of scarce vital resources, vulnerability to shocks, and limited opportunities for productive activities. As a result, their interactions are guided by the principles of reciprocity and mutual trust. Based on such reciprocal exchanges is the pattern of acting collectively around various challenges. Such interactions are usually based on some delineated rules or bylaws and manifest themselves in formal and informal institutions of collective action. All studies in this volume present ample evidence of cooperation, which in turn usually leads to positive poverty-related outcomes such as increased incomes, resource sustainability, fulfillment of basic needs, and enhanced property and personal security. For example, the Kenya case study spotlights various joint activities related to the functioning of the PMGs (elections, meetings) as well as the marketing of chickpea and pigeon pea crops (bulking, grading, sorting, and selling), leading to higher returns from marketing. The Afar study tells of collective management of pastures and cooperation around farming activities, insuring personal and property security among other things. The Ethiopia-iddir and Philippines studies provide examples of collective action in the form of membership in groups and networks for the purpose of risk mitigation, allowing households to prevent dips in welfare.
• Negotiations: Although negotiations usually imply bargaining processes that occur in the action arena and lead to the appearance of a particular pattern of interaction, the studies reported here show that in many settings, negotiations have become repeated behavior patterns (based on the action resources of the actors) that are in themselves an outcome of the action situation. The Indonesia and African Highlands Initiative case studies, both of which relied heavily on participatory action research methodology, demonstrate that multistakeholder negotiations can be catalyzed or facilitated; they become an important pattern of interaction through which poverty-related outcomes such as equitable NRM or access to vital resources are achieved. The Indonesia case study shows that these negotiations do not cease when the immediately desired changes are realized; they continue by engaging different actors and their action resources (for instance, various levels of government) to reach yet other outcomes. Unlike in the Indonesia case study, the negotiations over water resource use in the Ethiopia-Somali study are not emergent: such interactions have become regularized in this case due to the need to renegotiate and re-establish the rules of water use, which keep changing as a result of various climatic shocks, population pressures, and government policies. Overall, the negotiation processes recounted in this volume have been seen to improve the social and political inclusion of marginalized groups, which is difficult to achieve via other mechanisms. Moreover, the rules created in the negotiation processes have a potential to contribute to resource sustainability and increased incomes. For example, effective porcupine control in one of the African Highlands Initiative case studies has reduced crop destruction and freed up valuable time otherwise spent by communities in controlling the pest, while the equitable distribution of improved crop varieties has increased food security and incomes.
• Elite capture: Disparity in action resources such as wealth, gender, or political connections can cause more advantaged individuals to benefit more from interactions. Such unequal interactions can, in turn, lead to an unequal distribution of benefits. For example, the better-off members of the watershed user associations in India tended to reap more benefits from the collective management activities. In the Ethiopia-Somali example, the local pastoral elites were able to construct private water sources, which positioned them not only to have a stable water supply for their livestock but also to charge others a fee for using these water sources. The African Highlands Initiative study shows that the local leaders and others with connections to authorities have better access to agricultural research and extension, while women, for example, do not. The Indonesia study demonstrates the misuse of revolving funds and profiteering on unfair land sales by corrupt local elites. In Cambodia, less educated community members are less likely to participate in collective decisionmaking processes.
When interactions that advantage one set of actors at the expense of others are repeated over time, they lead to greater gaps in income and power outcomes for the elites vis-à-vis everyone else. This pattern of interaction actually hinders the fulfillment of certain positive poverty outcomes, especially social or political inclusion, as demonstrated by the case studies in this volume.
• Conflict: The case studies reviewed here show that in the context of limited resources, increasing population pressures, changing government policies, and vulnerability to shocks, interactions between individuals and groups can turn into conflict (cf. Buckles 1999; Homer-Dixon 1999) . Both the Afar and the Indonesia case studies show that scarcity of vital natural resources and ambiguity over rights and access to these resources carry a potential to turn into confrontations (of varying degrees) between various resource-dependent actors. The Cambodia case study echoes these findings: conflicts over land have been increasing as a result of the national policies (both past and present), the scarcity of arable land, and the ongoing process of land titling and demarcation. The Ethiopia-Somali study demonstrates how one-sided government policies can lead to the marginalization of one group and hence a violent conflict between that group and the state. These conflicts have a negative impact on people's livelihoods, with the worst consequences for the poorest.
• Interactions with the state: The ability of the poor to enhance their livelihoods is also affected by external political and legal structures (as shown in earlier sections). These case studies show interactions with the state that were often unfavorable to the poor. National policies and programs tend to overlook the reality on the ground, such as power dynamics and socioeconomic differentiation. They also disregard or misunderstand the needs of the poor. The Ethiopia-Somali and Ethiopia-Afar studies show that the sedentarization and privatization policies carried out by the Ethiopian state only exacerbated the pastoralists' vulnerability to shocks and gave more ground for elite capture by the better-off households, negatively affecting the pastoralists' inclusion in the political processes and their personal and property security. The Indonesian case study shows that the see-saw of forest management policies, some of which have a potential to benefit the poor, created ambiguity around access to forest-based resources and led to conflict between the forest communities and the private sector. The Cambodia study gives an example of a repeated bargaining process through petitions and protests between communities and local authorities. On the other hand, the African Highlands Initiative and Indonesia studies also give examples of interactions with local authorities (during the negotiation processes) that create conditions for positive outcomes for the poor, resulting in improvements in their "power" status (social and political inclusion), higher incomes, and greater tenure security.
Overall, the case studies show that the bargaining processes that occur in the action arena condition the behavior patterns that guide the interactions between the actors. These patterns are influenced by the action resources that the actors bring into the action situation and, in turn, directly impact povertyrelated outcomes. Although these patterns are not meant to serve as an entry point for any poverty program or policy, they are uniquely positioned for "tracking" the production of desired outcomes from the context through the action arena.
Linking It All Together
This chapter illustrates how the conceptual framework from Chapter 2 could be used for poverty research by using the examples of our case studies to connect the dots between the elements of the framework to show their relationship with collective action and property rights and their influence on poverty outcomes. Many of the findings of the case studies confirm hypotheses outlined in Chapter 2. Contextual factors influence how the institutions of collective action and property rights are formed, which in turn influences the action arena, where patterns of interaction lead to both positive and negative poverty outcomes. Even though most of the studies in this volume did not provide illustrations of the feedback loops from the outcomes to the context due to the limited time duration of the research projects, it is important to remember that the newly created outcomes are fed back into the context to eventually produce new action situations and new outcomes.
The case studies also show the strong links between collective action and property rights and why these two types of institutions were chosen to be part of the same framework, the same research project, and the same volume. The fifteen years of research findings collected by the Systemwide Program on Collective Action and Property Rights (CAPRi) of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research have shown the connection between the two, mentioned in Chapter 1. In Chapter 2 we proposed that looking at the two institutions together as the prism for understanding poverty may reveal some new lessons and insights for poverty reduction efforts and tie together the elements of a new conceptual framework derived from the "original" IAD framework.
The African Highlands Initiative, Indonesia, Ethiopia-Afar, EthiopiaSomali, and Cambodia case studies all explicitly demonstrate that collective action is an essential tool for securing greater access to resources, clarifying tenure arrangements, and promoting greater equity and sustainability of access. In many of these studies, property rights were precisely the reason that actors invested in organizing to engage with more powerful actors and authority structures. For example, in Indonesia the threat of losing access to forests and the need to have those claims recognized and protected was a primary reason for communities to organize. In the African Highlands Initiative case study, by organizing, groups that had been evicted from forests gained sufficient bargaining power to reclaim access and management rights to the forest. In both case studies, groups started investing in various forest-based income-generating activities. Even in the Kenya case study, which focused on collective action, PMG members are all landowners, demonstrating the importance of secure property rights in providing a launching pad from which to pursue collective income-generating opportunities. Breaking the link between the two institutions is shown to have negative consequences for the poor. In the Ethiopia-Afar case study, for instance, the conversion of communal property regimes (managed collectively) to state property withdrew resources from herders, including critical survival resources such as dry-season pastures. This transformation later created incentives for resource privatization, which saw wealthier and more influential individuals acquiring larger portions, squeezing the poorer and female-headed households into much smaller, less productive units. In this volume this interconnectedness between collective action and property rights is seen to play a role in achieving better outcomes for the poor, be they higher incomes, greater resource sustainability, enhanced property security, or increased social or political inclusion.
The studies also produced findings regarding poverty outcomes that had not been foreseen by the conceptual framework. We learned that collective action contributes to investments in and management of jointly held natural assets (as proposed in the framework), but these do not necessarily lead to identifiable effects on the asset endowments of the poor. Although collective action can result in improvements in resource management, the direct poverty outcomes of such improvements require longer time horizons to be realized, and it is possible that low levels of asset endowments may lock poorer households out of the benefits of resource improvements.
Three more lessons for poverty outcomes can be extracted from these casespecific findings:
1. Communities can organize on their own to resolve the challenges confronting their well-being, but they often do so imperfectly, leaving out those among them who stand to gain the most from joint action. There are thus limits to collective action, and researchers, policymakers, and practitioners need to be aware of this gap and to design research practices and policy interventions that actively identify and target those excluded from the benefits of group action. 2. External actors who are trusted (that is, whose interests are not contrary to or in direct competition with those of interested internal or external actors) and who have resources (such as time, money, or reputation) can motivate collective action that may lead to favorable implications for community well-being, including the alleviation of the elite capture of resources or the expansion of the access rights of poorer, less powerful actors. 3. Well-functioning collective action, regardless of whether it is mediated by external entities, is important for secure property rights. This is seen particularly in the case studies in which collective action was weak; resources are subject to elite capture or acquisition by outsiders.
Because poverty is a complex condition, these propositions and findings are by no means exhaustive, nor are they meant to be; they are, rather, illustrative of some of the factors that researchers, policymakers, or practitioners seeking a better understanding of poverty can explore. We take these up in the context of the themes of the volume in the concluding chapter.
